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Giving the Benefit of the Doubt 
 
 
Faced with evidence that what a person said is false, we can nevertheless trust 
them and so believe what they say Ñ choosing to give them the benefit of the 
doubt. This is particularly notable when the person is a friend, or someone we are 
close to. Towards such persons, we demonstrate a remarkable epistemic partiality. 
We can trust, and so believe, our friends even when the balance of the evidence 
suggests that what they tell us is false. And insofar as belief is possible, it is also 
possible to acquire testimonial knowledge on those occasions when the friends 
know what they tell us. This paper seeks to explain these psychological and 
epistemological possibilities. 
 
 
1.!    
Walking home alone at night you come across someone badly injured. Going to their aid 
you find, to your horror, it is your estranged partner and they have been stabbed with 
what appears to be your kitchen knife. You call the ambulance and police, but your 
partner dies before they arrive. When they do arrive, the police arrest you. The evidence 
against you is significant. Your prints are all over the knife and you had a motive. In this 
2 
nightmare scenario, you know that you are innocent. You know that all the evidence 
indicating otherwise is misleading and has some other explanation. What you need to do 
is convince someone of these facts so that this alternative explanation is sought! The 
problem is that all the evidence suggests that what you say is false. And if one had such 
seemingly good but in fact misleading evidence that an instrument is broken, there would 
be no epistemic options: this evidence would mean that one could not but reject its 
readings. However, in protesting your innocence to your friend, you do not take your 
friend to be similarly epistemically bound by the evidence. It seems possible for your 
friend to give you the benefit of the doubt. It seems possible for your friend to trust you, 
and so to learn what really happened.  
The aim of this paper is to give an account of what makes this possible. In the 
next section, I develop the epistemological issues that situate the problem. 
 
2.!    
Evidence can be misleading. So it is possible for an audience to have evidence that a 
speaker is lying when in fact the speaker is being truthful and telling the truth. Since the 
possibility under investigation is a matter of what is possible for an audience, imagine 
now that you are in the position of the audience who is the friend. 
The murder case. The evidence suggests that your friend is guilty of murdering 
their estranged partner. Your friend comes to you and protests their innocence. In 
fact, your friend is innocent and has been very cleverly framed.  
Three things, I think, are true of this case.  
3 
First, it is psychologically possible for you to believe your friend. One way of 
making sense of this possibility is to imagine that, in considering whether your friend is 
innocent, you bring to bear everything you know about your friend Ñ their history, 
circumstance, character, values, the fact that they value your friendship and care about 
truthfulness Ñ and so come to judge that this evidence, in conjunction with their 
testimony, outweighs the evidence pointing to their guilt. However, this possibility 
should be excluded: the murder case should be read as a case where the balance of 
evidence, when impartially considered, points to your friendÕs guilt. The first claim is that 
even in this situation, you could believe your friend.
1
 The claim, here, is not that belief is 
probable but possible. The way that things would probably play out would be that you 
would listen to your friendÕs account, weigh the evidence, and at a certain point either 
trust your friend, giving them the benefit of the doubt Ñ or not.
2
 Moreover, that you 
should trust your friend Ñ that you should put your faith in them, and so believe them Ñ 
is a claim that has been much discussed.
3
 A presupposition of this discussion is that belief 
is a psychological possibility. 
Second, it is epistemologically possible for you to get to know that your friend is 
innocent on the basis of believing her when she tells you this. That this should be taken as 
an epistemological datum is shown by imagining the murder case, as section 1 does, from 
                                                
1
 For an actual case of giving the benefit of the doubt, consider Peter HymanÕs testimony that he believed 
O.J. Simpson when the latter told him, before the trial and in the face of the evidence, that he didnÕt kill 
Nicole. (From Ezra EdelmanÕs documentary O.J.Simpson: Made in America, 2017). 
2
 See AudiÕs (1997: 407) example of talking to a stranger on a plane and coming to believe them.  
3
 See Baker (1987), Keller (2004), Stroud (2006), Kawall (2013) and Hawley (2014).  
4 
the speakerÕs perspective. In seeking a friend, so that you can tell them what happened to 
you, you hope to be believed not merely because this is good in-itself, but because you 
want your friend to learn what really happened. In telling your friend that you are 
innocent you take it that you have put them in a position to know this, if they can only 
believe you. Moreover, suppose you were wrong in this and that your telling does not put 
your friend in this epistemic position; to assert so much would be to deny that trusting 
someone who knows offers a unique route to knowledge. The second starting point of 
this paper is the contrary claim that trusting someone who knows does identify a unique 
route to knowledge.
4
 It is the (epistemic) intuition that your friend could learn what 
happened, if only they could believe you, which, I think, is as robust as the 
(psychological) intuition that your friend could believe you. 
Nevertheless, third, this epistemological datum is problematized by the fact that 
the balance of evidence supports your believing that your friend is guilty. So while it 
might be allowed that trusting someone who knows identifies a unique way of getting to 
know, it can still be denied that it is a way of getting to know in this case. That is, in this 
case the possibility of acquiring knowledge seems to be blocked. This idea might be put 
in terms of defeat: any possibility of getting to know that your friend is innocent seems to 
be normatively defeated.
5
 The relevant defeater here is normative because given that the 
evidence of your friendÕs guilt is in fact misleading, there are no undefeated objective 
defeaters. And if you do manage to believe your friend, trusting her for the truth, it 
                                                
4
 For support, see Vendler (1979), Ross (1986), Moran (2005), Hinchman (2005), Faulkner (2007), Keren 
(2007), McMyler (2011), and Fricker (2012). 
5
 For this classification of defeaters see Lackey (2008: 44-46). 
5 
follows that there are no undefeated subjective defeaters. Of course, the worry is that 
epistemically you should not trust your friend for the truth given the evidence you have, 
which, again, is to say that the relevant defeaters are normative: the issue is the epistemic 
reasonableness of believing your friend is innocent when the balance of evidence, 
impartially considered, points to your friendÕs guilt.
6
 It follows that a requirement on any 
explanation of how you get to know that your friend is innocent is that it must show how 
believing your friend can be epistemically reasonable. 
The philosophical challenge is then to account for these three data-points: (1) to 
explain how belief in the face of the evidence is a psychological possibility; (2) to explain 
how the acquisition of testimonial knowledge in the face of the evidence is an 
epistemological possibility; and (3) to explain how believing your friend can be 
epistemically reasonable when the balance of evidence, impartially considered, suggests 
that it is not epistemically reasonable, and thereby implies that the possibility of acquiring 
knowledge is normatively defeated. In the next three sections, I sketch three possible 
explanations of these data-points, before arguing for a fourth explanation in the final two 
sections. 
 
                                                
6
 Similarly, KellerÕs (2004: 331-332) central case of Rebecca and Eric has the balance of evidence favour 
disbelief. 
6 
3.!    
One explanation of how belief is possible in the murder case starts from the fact that in 
this case it is a friend that tells you she is innocent. ÒFriendshipÓ, Sarah Stroud (2006: 
499) observes, Òplaces demands not just on our feelings or our motivations, but on our 
beliefs and our methods of forming beliefsÓ. This is to say that friendship Òpositively 
demands epistemic bias, understood as an epistemically unjustified departure from 
epistemic objectivityÓ (Stroud 2006: 518). Similarly, Simon Keller (2004: 329) concludes 
that Òepistemic norms sometimes conflict with the requirements of friendshipÓ. In 
listening to these requirements of friendship, we are then led to demonstrate epistemic 
bias; the balance of evidence might suggest that our friend is guilty, but we do not 
consider this evidence impartially. First, we question any evidence that puts our friend in 
a bad light and attempt to undermine its evidential value. If one bit of evidence against 
your friend is that their estranged partner was stabbed with their kitchen knife, you would 
try and imagine alternative explanations of this fact under which your friend is innocent; 
the knife was stolen, for instance. That is, we Òtry to discredit the evidenceÓ (Stroud 
2006: 509). Second, we try to put a different interpretation on what evidence cannot be 
discredited in order to charitably conceive a friendÕs action and motives. If you could not 
deny that your friend did the killing, you might, for example, then conceive it as an act of 
self-defence. In this way, we seek interpretations of our friendsÕ conduct that is as 
favourable as the evidence will allow. In doing so, Stroud (2006: 508) jokes, Òwe become 
spin doctorsÓ.  
The idea that we treat testimony from friends differently Ñ that we are 
epistemically partial and so more likely to believe it Ñ explains the psychological datum, 
7 
namely that belief is a possibility in the murder case. Moreover, late in her paper Stroud 
(2006: 522) suggests that this fact should force us to Òrethink the assumption that 
epistemic rationality requires the kind of epistemic objectivity or impartiality from which 
friendship seems necessarily to departÓ. Here Stroud questions the assumption that 
epistemic partiality entails epistemic irrationality; rather, she suggests that the demands 
of friendship can make it epistemically reasonable to believe your friend. Assuming that 
this is true of the murder case, Stroud both endorses the third epistemological data point 
Ñ that believing your friend can be epistemically reasonable Ñ and offers a suggestion 
as to why this is so: the demands of friendship make it so. However, what is left 
mysterious is how the demands of friendship do this. In the next section, I consider one 
way of developing this explanation and removing this mystery. But first I want to raise a 
general worry about this explanatory strategy. 
The general worry is that believing-your-friend-out-of-friendship seems to fall 
short of simply believing your friend; and if it does, then it would leave your friend 
frustrated. Pamela Hieronymi (2008: 219) makes this point when discussing her own 
murder case and in criticism of non-cognitive notions of trust: what the friend demands is 
trust in the sense of belief; Òyour friend wants you to trust that she is innocent; she wants 
you to believe herÓ. HieronymiÕs worry is that unless trust entails belief, the friendÕs 
demand to be trusted is unsatisfied. For example, merely accepting what your friend says, 
and thereby treating your friend as if she were innocent, offering her shelter and so on, 
would not be enough. It would not be enough because you could do this all the while 
believing, based on the evidence, that your friend is guilty. Similarly, unless believing-
out-of-friendship entails believing Ñ and so entails crediting your friend with knowing 
8 
that she is innocent Ñ your friendÕs demand to be believed is unsatisfied. The following 
explanation of how friendship supports belief then goes some way to appeasing this 
worry.  
 
4.!    
What is needed is a defence of Òthe rationality of partialityÓ, and such an argument is 
provided by Berislav Marušić (2015: 174). Consider first what reason one has for 
believing that someone, S, will φ. In considering this question, one must distinguish 
between the perspectives of the agent and an observer. An observer, if disinterested, will 
look to the evidence and here SÕs track record will be crucial. But from the agentÕs point 
of view whether ÔS will φÕ is a matter up to the agent, S, to decide. The decision to φ, or 
not, is something S resolves by practical reasoning. And in supporting the decision to φ 
these practical reasons equally support SÕs belief that she will φ; this belief is a practical 
belief: a belief Òformed in light of, and made rational by Épractical reasonsÓ (Marušić 
2015: 137).  
Two consequences follow from this idea that practical reasons can support belief. 
First, it would be an instance of bad faith and a denial of her agency for S to look to the 
evidence in forming a belief as to whether she will φ. For S, these theoretical reasons for 
belief are the wrong kind of reasons for belief. Second, S can rationally decide to φ and 
so believe that she will φ even when the evidence suggests that she will fail to φ. For 
example, S can decide to quit smoking on the basis of good reasons for doing so, and 
thereby believe that she will do so, even if she has tried and failed before. That is, the fact 
9 
that a practical belief Ògoes against the evidence does not entail that the belief is 
epistemically irrational É [because e]vidential considerations are É the wrong kind of 
reasons to evaluate such beliefsÓ (Marušić 2015: 138). Rather, it is SÕs practical reasons 
for quitting that justify SÕs belief that she will quit; they do so because these reasons 
make it likely that this belief is true.
7
 
This distinction between the perspectives of the agent and an observer then has an 
analogue in the epistemology of testimony: it is the distinction between the perspectives 
of a participant and an observer. And this distinction is relevant when considering what 
reason one has for believing that S will φ when S tells one that she will φ. An audience A 
takes the observerÕs perspective when he treats SÕs telling him that she will φ as piece of 
evidence and proceeds to judge whether S will φ on the basis of the evidence. Citing 
Richard Moran, Marušić claims that this response to SÕs testimony introduces 
ÒdisharmonyÓ into the testimonial exchange because SÕs expectation of A is that A will 
believe she will φ not on the evidence of her telling but on the promise that her telling 
amounts to.
8
 The correct response to SÕs telling is then to take S at her word and to see it 
as a promise to φ, or in MoranÕs terms SÕs assurance that she will φ. Were A to respond 
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 While S can believe she will quit smoking even if she has tried to do this and failed before, S must 
recognise her ÔfacticityÕ, which is to say any track record of failure, or other evidence that she will fail. 
However, these facts introduce practical considerations; they do not defeat the rationality of SÕs belief, and 
so this need not force S to retreat to the belief that she will merely try to quit, see (Marušić 2015: 125-28). 
This account of practical belief is inspired by VellemanÕs (1996) idea that we should distinguish beliefs that 
Ôcreate the truthÕ and beliefs that Ôreflect the truthÕ. 
8
 Moran (2005: 23) quoted Marušić (2015: 182). 
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in this way, A would take the participant stance and trust S.
9
 To trust S would then be for 
A to regard SÕs testimony as offering an answer to the question of whether S will φ, and 
to accept SÕs answer as his own.  
It follows, Marušić (2015: 198) claims, that in trust, Ò[t]he identity of the speaker 
and the nature of the speakerÕs relationship to the addressee are of crucial importance if 
telling consists in offering an answer É [because w]hen we are offered something it 
matters to us not just what is offered but also who is offering. For instance, if you are 
offered a ride, it very much matters who is offering Ñ whether it is a stranger or an 
acquaintance, a friend or lover, a parent or supervisorÓ. The identity of the speaker is 
thereby an essential part of the reason that trust provides: in believing because of trust, 
AÕs reason is that S told him. Trust based reasons are thereby different in kind to 
evidential reasons. And since Òthe weight of the reasons of trust does not correspond to 
their evidential weight, it is possible to rationally trust against the evidenceÓ (Marušić 
2015: 202). So, to continue the last example, SÕs friend could believe her when she says 
that she will quit smoking while someone taking the observerÕs perspective might not be 
able to do so, given SÕs track record. Like practical belief, trusting belief is thereby 
contrasted with theoretical belief. 
Marušić could then give the following account of the murder case. Given that it is 
your friend who tells you that she is innocent, and so offers her answer to the question of 
her innocence, you will be prone to trust your friend and so take her answer as your own. 
                                                
9
 The term Ôparticipant stanceÓ comes from Holton (1994), who takes it from Strawson (1974). 
 
11 
In believing your friend, you Òmaintain the participant stance and refuse to take the 
objective stanceÓ (Marušić 2015: 202). And in doing this your belief is supported by the 
reason Ñ that your friend told you that she was innocent Ñ and reasonable because of 
this. 
Suppose that this is all accepted. It follows that an explanation of the first datum 
is given: you can believe your friend simply because you resolutely stay within the 
participant stance and so trust your friend. And an explanation of the third datum is 
given: you are epistemically reasonable in believing your friend is innocent because this 
is a trusting belief. But what about the second datum? Does this account of the 
reasonableness of trusting belief explain how you can learn that your friend is innocent?  
It seems not. On MarušićÕs account it turns out that the acquisition of testimonial 
knowledge can be defeated even when the reasons got from trust render this testimonial 
belief reasonable. Suppose that the reason stated by Ômy friend told me that she is 
innocentÕ is strong enough to fix testimonial belief and make it reasonable. The problem 
is that in the murder case the balance of evidence still points to your friendÕs guilt. This 
point deserves emphasis: given that it is your friend who tells you that she is innocent, 
you have particularly good epistemic reasons to believe this Ñ reasons based on your 
knowledge of your friendÕs track record, her character, her values, that she cares for your 
friendship etc. Ñ but the hypothesis is that no matter how good these epistemic reasons, 
the balance of evidence points to your friendÕs guilt.
10
 And when this is so, on MarušićÕs 
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 As such, the reasonableness of your believing your friend cannot be explained by reference to the 
additional epistemic reasons that friendship provides, contrary to Goldberg (2017). 
12 
account, this balance of evidence prevents your learning from your friend that she is 
innocent: when Òyou have evidence that there is a significant chance of not-p, then you 
do not know that p through testimony, because this evidence is a defeater for your 
knowledgeÓ (Marušić 2015: 189). 
Does the evidence which defeats the acquisition of testimonial knowledge also 
defeat the epistemic reasonableness of trust based belief? Given that one can reasonably 
trust against the evidence, one might think not. However, trust isnÕt always reasonable: a 
reason of trust is a Òprima face conclusive reasonÓ (Marušić 2015: 193, n.31) which is 
defeated by evidence of untrustworthiness
 
.
11
 In the murder case, the evidence of your 
friendÕs guilt implies that your friend is lying when she tells you that she is innocent. It 
follows that this evidence can equally be taken to be evidence of your friendÕs 
untrustworthiness. However, this kind of evidence of untrustworthiness would be present 
whenever there was counter-evidence to testimony, and it cannot be that all counter-
evidence is evidence of untrustworthiness because Marušić wants to allow that trust can 
be reasonable in the face of the evidence. Thus, he states, Òit is possible to rationally trust 
against the evidence. And if it is possible to rationally trust against the evidence, then we 
can rationally trust without having knowledgeÓ (Marušić 2015: 202). It follows that the 
evidence in the murder case would normatively defeat the acquisition of testimonial 
knowledge even though it need not defeat the reasonableness of trust. 
Thus, MarušićÕs account of the rationality of partiality, which develops StroudÕs 
idea that friendship can make belief epistemically reasonable, explains two out of three of 
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 Hinchman (2014) equally takes trust to be a Òprima facie conclusive reasonÓ. 
13 
the starting data points. It fails to explain how it is that you can learn that your friend is 
innocent from her telling you this.  
 
5.!    
How is it, then, that you can get to know that your friend is innocent from her telling you 
this? In this section, I want to consider the idea that knowledge and epistemic 
justification are sensitive to practical and moral matters. This will allow the argument that 
in the murder case the evidence pointing to your friendÕs guilt does not allow you to 
know that your friend is guilty; but the evidence of your friendÕs testimony does allow 
you to know that she is innocent.  
Differences in practical facts, Jason Stanley argues Ñ that is, differences in facts 
about the costs associated with oneÕs beliefs being right or wrong Ñ can constitute 
differences in knowledge. Knowledge is partly Òa matter of how much is at stakeÓ 
(Stanley 2004: 6). Stanley illustrates this, and argues for it, by reference to the well-
known bank case.
12
 You need to deposit a cheque and go to the bank after work on a 
Friday to find a long queue. You recall that the bank was open on a Saturday morning 
two weeks ago. There are then two cases to compare. In the high stakes case, you have a 
bill due and insufficient funds to cover it if your cheque is not deposited before Monday. 
In the low stakes case, you have no such worries. When considering these cases, the 
intuition is meant to be that you know the bank is open on Saturday in the low stakes 
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 Owed to DeRose (1992) 
14 
case, but do not know this in the high stakes case, even though your evidence is the same 
in both cases. This intuition, Stanley argues, then Òprovides a prima facie case for the 
thesis that knowledge is not just a matter of non-practical facts, but is also a matter of 
how much is at stakeÓ (Stanley 2004: 6). The domains of theoretical reason and practical 
reason rather than being distinct, as Marušić argues, in fact encroach on one another. 
This Òprima face caseÓ for pragmatic encroachment can be supported by 
reference to the principles linking knowledge and rational action.
13
 If you know that p, 
then you are practically justified in acting on p.
14
 And, it follows, if you are not 
practically justified in acting on p, then you donÕt know that p. In the low stakes case, it 
would be practically rational to delay depositing the cheque (given the queue and your 
recollecting that the bank was open two Saturdays ago). So there is no barrier to 
supposing that you know that the bank is open this Saturday. However, in the high stakes 
case, it would be practically irrational to delay depositing the cheque until tomorrow 
(given the cost associated with a failure to deposit it). So it cannot be the case that you 
similarly know that the bank is open this Saturday. Thus, the idea is that practical facts 
encroach on our knowing things through raising and lowering the epistemic standards for 
knowledge. 
Moreover, it is arguable that moral facts similarly encroach on knowledge and 
justification. Michael Pace (2011) illustrates this claim with the example of a shipbuilder 
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 Term from Ichikama and Steup (2014) 
14
 Compare Òone should act only on what one knowsÓ, Stanley (2004: 9); and ÒIf you know that p, then p is 
warranted enough to justify you in φing, for any φÓ Fantl and McGrath (2009: 67). 
15 
who, because of cutting costs in manufacture, has evidence, but not good evidence, that 
his latest vessel is seaworthy. Given the risk for the passengers of this belief being false, 
practical costs raise the standards for justification. The result is that the cost cutting 
means the shipbuilder no longer knows, as he should, that his vessel is seaworthy. But 
what, Pace asks, if the shipbuilder does not have the practical concerns that morally he 
ought to have? One would not want to conclude that he does, after all, know the vessel to 
be seaworthy. Rather, this is a case where moral considerations raise the epistemic bar. 
Equally, but conversely, Òcommitting to be in certain relationships Ñ e.g. becoming É a 
friend Ñ seems to generate moral obligations to have low evidential standards for certain 
propositions. These obligations are naturally described as Ôgiving the benefit of the 
doubtÕ or Ôthinking charitably of othersÕÓ (Pace 2011: 258). 
Now consider the murder case in the light of these claims. Confronted with 
evidence of your friendÕs guilt, the demands of friendship Ñ be they moral demands or 
practical concerns Ñ are such that this is a high stakes case. It is a high stakes case 
because if you donÕt trust your friend when she is trustworthy, you risk your friendship. 
Your valuing your friendship and the obligations associated with friendship itself (if there 
are any) then make this risk a significant one. The epistemic requirement on knowing that 
your friend is guilty is thereby raised; and one might suppose it is raised to the point that 
you donÕt know that your friend is guilty. But if your evidence does not put you in a 
position to know that your friend is guilty, then it is not true that you ought to believe 
this. In PaceÕs terms (2011: 251), you should follow the counsel of caution: ÒdonÕt 
believe p so that you avoid believing a falsehoodÓ; that is, you should rather not believe 
that she is guilty. It follows that balance of evidence does not give you a normative 
16 
defeater for the belief that she is innocent. So you can get to know that she is innocent on 
the basis of trusting her when she tells you this. 
The problem with this strategy is that there must be limits on how high the 
demands of friendship can raise the epistemic bar. For example, the epistemic 
requirement could not be raised to certainty because to raise it so high would be to 
declare that practical facts and moral considerations can render observational truths 
unknowable. But if the upper limit falls below certainty, it will always be possible to 
imagine a case where there is sufficient evidence to cross the raised threshold for 
knowledge, and yet the evidence still be misleading. The problem is then: this is what 
could be imagined in the murder case. To add some colour consider the Hollywood 
murder case which is the same as the murder case except that it could be a plot written 
for Hollywood, which includes a powerful and nefarious government agency setting out 
to frame your friend. It follows that the evidence of your friendÕs guilt might be so 
stacked that even given the demands of friendship the balance of evidence would allow 
you to cross whatever epistemic threshold is needed for knowledge. It follows that you 
ought to believe that your friend is guilty and so the possibility of learning that your 
friend is innocent is normatively defeated. As such, while this strategy might be able to 
explain the three data points in some cases, it cannot explain how you can learn that your 
friend is innocent in the beefed-up Hollywood murder case. 
 
17 
6.!    
In this section and the next, I propose a solution to the starting problematic. Friendship, I 
will argue, provides practical reasons for you to reconsider the question of your friendÕs 
guilt. And it motivates you to deliberate over this question until the point that you are 
epistemically justified in suspending your belief that your friend is guilty. Insofar as this 
belief has been justifiably put to one side, it ceases to be the case that you ought to 
believe that your friend is guilty. As such, in trusting your friend when she tells that she 
is innocent, you are in a position where you can learn that she is innocent. 
To develop this proposal, let me return to the challenge facing MarušićÕs position. 
To learn that your friend is innocent, Marušić (2015: 179) claims, the reason given by her 
telling Òwould have to defeat all [the] evidenceÓ you have that she is guilty. Suppose that 
this is taken to be a requirement on your justifiably suspending your belief that your 
friend is guilty: that your friendÕs testimony provide sufficient defeating reason. That is, 
suppose that one is justified in suspending belief only if one has sufficient defeating 
reason. To propose this requirement on the justified suspension of belief would be to 
introduce, what Matthew Soteriou (2013: 360) calls, epistemic traps. These are situations 
where one is unjustified in belief Ñ because one forms the belief in an epistemically 
unjustified way Ñ but possessing no counter-evidence one is nevertheless unjustified in 
abandoning this unjustified belief. When epistemically trapped, the epistemic demands 
conflict: oneÕs belief is unjustified but one is not justified in abandoning it. The murder 
case itself is not an epistemic trap since you are justified in believing your friend is 
guilty. Nevertheless, this justification is not knowledge supporting, since it based on 
misleading evidence, so it is a case where there is a justificatory failure, but where, on the 
18 
condition proposed, suspending belief is still unjustified. Thus, like the possibility of 
epistemic traps, it motivates SoteriouÕs proposal of a different account of when the 
suspension of belief is justified. 
ÒÔS is justified in suspending judgement over pÕ can be interpreted as meaning 
different thingsÓ, Soteriou (2013: 363) says, 
either (a) given SÕs evidential situation Ñ i.e. given the evidence S does and does 
not possess Ñ S ought to suspend judgement over p, or (b) S has attempted to 
determine whether p and she has not (yet) done anything that justifies her judging 
that p or judging that not-p. 
The first interpretation, (a), applies to situations where S doesnÕt already believe that p. 
For instance, I doubt that anyone believes that there are an odd number of ducks, and per 
(a), one ought to suspend judgement over this. The second interpretation, (b), applies to 
situations where S already believes that p, but then withdraws assent from p, suspending 
belief. To illustrate this situation, consider the case of the student mathematician. From a 
recent lecture S knows that p and is given the exercise of proving that p. In attempting 
this proof, S brackets her knowledge that p and proceeds to try and work out whether p. 
Suppose she fails to come up with a proof and after long frustration at trying to come up 
with one she begins to doubt that she copied the theorem down correctly. In this position, 
the two routes available to her for justifiably judging that p Ñ namely the production of a 
successful proof, or recollecting what the lecturer said Ñ are both blocked. In this 
position, she cannot do anything to justifiably judge that p, and is thereby justified in 
suspending judgement over p. 
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Consider, then, the application of this theory of when the suspension of belief is 
justified to the bank case and the murder case. In the two bank cases, one knows that the 
bank is open on Saturday because one can recall going there a couple of weekends ago. 
However, if one brackets this belief and tries to work out whether the bank is open on 
Saturday, as one does in the high stakes case, this recollection is undermined by the 
thought that Saturday open hours are irregular.
15
 One has no information about the 
opening hours this Saturday, so nothing now allows one to justifiably judge that the bank 
is open tomorrow. In this position, one is justified in suspending oneÕs belief that the 
bank will open tomorrow. As such, Soteriou (2013: 367) proposes that 
we should not regard such cases as ones in which the epistemic standards 
required for knowledge have shifted. Rather, we should regard them as cases in 
which two options are epistemically available to the subject. Both suspending 
judgement over p and continuing to believe that p are epistemically permissible. 
The differences in practical circumstances between the two situations affect 
which epistemic option it is more practically rational for the subject to take. 
The suggestion here is not that practical facts encroach upon epistemic justification (as 
was proposed in section 5) but that the bank case is one where there are epistemic options 
Ñ continue to believe the bank is open on Saturday or suspend this belief Ñ and 
practical facts then determine which epistemic option it is reasonable to take.
16
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 Or, as Stanley (2004: 4) has it, by oneÕs partner pointing out that Òbanks do change their hoursÓ.  
16
 Similarly, see Brown (2008). 
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The same then goes for the murder case. Given all the misleading evidence, you 
are justified in believing that your friend is guilty of murder. But because of friendship 
when your friend protests her innocence, you reconsider whether she is guilty or not. This 
sees you bracketing your belief that she is guilty and attempting to work out whether she 
is. In this situation, it might be that other explanations of the evidence can be given such 
that you can conclude that nothing allows you to justifiably judge that she is guilty. 
Suppose for the moment this is so, and that the murder case is just like the bank case. It 
follows that you would be justified in suspending your belief that your friend is guilty, 
and, given your deliberation, it is thereby no longer true that you ought to believe her 
guilty. That is, insofar you are justified in suspending your belief that she is guilty, where 
this belief was based on all the evidence against your friend, there is no further normative 
defeater that would block your learning that she is innocent. So in trusting her when she 
tells you this, you could get to know that she is innocent. 
The murder case is then different from the bank case because it can be imagined 
in a ÔHollywoodÕ style, where the evidence of your friendÕs guilt is very convincing. With 
respect to this Hollywood murder case, when you bracket your belief that your friend is 
guilty and consider whether she is, the evidence upon which you originally acquired your 
belief in her guilt might be such that you can think of no other plausible alternative 
explanation of it than your friendÕs guilt. So even after reflection, you would still be in a 
position of being able to justifiably judge your friend guilty, and would thereby be 
unjustified in abandoning this belief. However, reflection does not need to end at this 
point. Reflection can be extended. Even if you conclude that the evidence does allow you 
to judge that your friend is guilty, you can then bracket your belief in the evidence, or 
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some part of it, and reconsider what grounds you have for believing some bit of evidence 
holds true. In this regard, Soteriou (2013: 368-9) says,  
Even if, upon reflection, one realizes that one is justified in judging that one does 
not know that p, it does not follow that one does not know that p. For suspending 
judgement over q (when the evidence that q may have played a role in the 
reasoning leading to oneÕs justified judgement that one does not know that p) 
may be an epistemically permissible option.  
Thus, it seems that through critically reflecting on whether your friend is guilty and the 
evidence you have for this, it is possible for a route to open to the epistemically justified 
suspension of your belief that she is guilty. Insofar as this is possible, the conclusion of 
the previous paragraph can be restated: were you able to justifiably suspend this belief, 
there would be no further normative defeater blocking your learning from your friend that 
she is innocent.
17
 
The obvious worry about this proposal concerns where the epistemic limits lie. 
There must be limits as to when we can justifiably suspend belief, and so there must be 
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 This account of when the suspension of belief is justified entails that different beliefs can be 
epistemically reasonable on the same body of evidence. See Kelly (2008) for further support. Hawley 
(2014: 2040) then argues that such Òepistemic permissivenessÓ Ñ like Pace (2011), she focuses on how 
different people differently Òstrike the balance between pursuing true belief and avoiding false beliefÓ Ñ 
Òplaces yet another obstacle in the way of those who argue that non-epistemic reasons, such as reasons of 
friendship, can conflict with epistemic reasons, especially where trust is concerned.Ó This section then 
elaborates this claim through explaining how believing a friend in the face of the evidence can be 
epistemically reasonable. 
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versions of the Hollywood murder case where the possibility of your learning of your 
friendÕs innocence is normatively defeated. Even when arguing that friendship involves 
departures from epistemic rationality as it is standardly conceived, Stroud (2006: 506) 
observes that friendship cannot require Òwilfully believing the falseÓ or Òinvolve a total 
imperviousness to damning evidenceÓ. The question is then: where do these limits lie? 
And one answer might be: one could not justifiably suspend oneÕs belief that p if one 
knows that not-p. It would follow that one could not believe the friend who told one 
something one knew to be false. However, this condition would not change the result in 
the murder case since you do not know that your friend is guilty, and cannot know this 
since it is false. Moreover, this is not where the limits lie as is illustrated by the case of 
the student mathematician. This student starts from a position of knowing that p but is 
nevertheless justified in suspending her belief that p.
18
 
A stronger proposal would be that the epistemic limits lie at the point of epistemic 
obligation. For instance, if the evidence against your friend were such that it obliged you 
to believe that she is guilty, then were you to bracket this belief and consider whether she 
is guilty, the reflective result would be that you are epistemically obliged to judge that 
she is so. Withdrawing assent from your belief that your friend is guilty would then not 
be justified and the route to learning of your friendÕs innocence would be normatively 
defeated. 
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 In addition, to put the limit at this point would be to succumb to the dogmatism paradox, or the claim that 
if one knows that p, one can ignore all evidence that not p. See Lewis (1996) and Soteriou (2013: 364). 
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However, one is rarely under epistemic obligation. Observational evidence is 
fallible, and so consistent with the falsity of what it is evidence for. And it would be a 
sorry state of affairs if you were epistemically obligated to believe the falsehood that your 
friend is guilty. To be epistemically obligated to believe a falsehood would be akin to 
being caught in an epistemic trap: it would amount to some deep-rooted failure of 
justification. But insofar as the evidence does not oblige belief, there will be a route 
available that ends in the justified suspension of belief. The more extravagant the murder 
case is imagined to be Ñ the more like a Hollywood movie it is Ñ the greater the degree 
of reflection that would be needed to open this route up. For this reason, your friend turns 
to you Ñ her friend Ñ since only friendship, with its accompanying demands, would 
make it practically rational to engage in this kind of reflective endeavour. But on the 
assumption that the evidence doesnÕt oblige belief, as it is very unlikely to, the reward of 
this reflective endeavour would be that you could justifiably abandon your belief that 
your friend is guilty. And since this belief was based on all the evidence against your 
friend, there is no further normative defeater that would prevent you learning of her 
innocence in trusting her when she tells you this. 
 
7.!    
The last section focussed on the issue of normative defeat. It sought to explain how it 
need not be the case that normative defeat prevents your learning your friend is innocent. 
However, to argue so much is not yet to show that you can learn that your friend is 
innocent. What is needed for this is some positive statement as to how you can believe 
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that your friend is innocent and be epistemically reasonable in believing this. Once this 
positive account is in place, all three of the starting data-points will then be accounted 
for. 
The account I would propose, (Faulkner 2011), as to why you believe that your 
friend is innocent and can be epistemically reasonable in doing so is similar in key 
respects to that offered by Marušić (2015) and outlined in section 4. In particular, the key 
idea is that your belief that your friend is innocent arises through taking the participant 
stance and so trusting your friend. As I would characterise things, to trust your friend for 
the truth is to believe what your friend tells you, and to believe what she tells you just 
because you trust her for the truth in this matter. Your having this attitude of trust 
involves taking a participant stance because it involves viewing your friendÕs testimony 
in the way that your friend expects you to view it, which is as offering her assurance that 
what she tells you is true. That you can, in trust, view your friendÕs testimony this way 
explains how belief is psychologically possible. This is the first data-point: belief is 
psychologically possible because trust is.  
Your attitude of trusting your friend for the truth explains your willingness to 
view her telling as assurance because trust involves you making the presumption that 
your friend tells you that she is innocent just because she knows that this is so. Insofar as 
trust involves this presumption your belief that she is innocent is thereby epistemically 
rationalised by your attitude of trust, (Faulkner 2011: 150-9). Moreover, in trusting your 
friend for the truth, and so making this presumption, you would thereby recognise your 
friendÕs epistemic authority and so regard her telling you that she is innocent as giving 
you a preemptive reason to believe this, which is also a reason to ÒdisregardÓ any 
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counter-evidence, (Keren 2007: 373). To ÒdisregardÓ the counter-evidence, I suggest, is 
to suspend belief in it. Given that your friend knows what she tells you, whether you get 
to know too then depends on whether your disregarding the counter-evidence is justified. 
And this hinges on whether you engage in the kind of deliberative process described in 
the last section. Thus, and in sum, the possibility of trust then further explains how belief 
can be epistemically reasonable, and the possibility of justified suspension of judgement 
explains how the knowledge that you can acquire on trust need not be defeated. These are 
the other two data-points. 
In conclusion, the final question to consider is what role friendship plays in these 
explanations. You believe that your friend is innocent because you trust her for the truth 
in this matter. And your belief that she is innocent is epistemically reasonable because 
you trust her the truth in this matter. Trust plays both a causal and justificatory role. 
Friendship figures in these explanations Ñ it is your friend that you trust Ñ but it does 
not figure essentially: what makes belief possible and epistemically reasonable are facts 
to do with trust rather than friendship. Specifically, and put in general terms, it is that in 
trusting a speaker who tells one that p one makes the presumption that the speaker tells 
one that p because they know that p. For this reason, in trusting a speaker one views their 
telling as the assurance it purports to be. On the speakerÕs side the same is true: 
friendship figures in the explanation Ñ it is you, her friend, that she tells Ñ but does not 
figure essentially. The expectation that your friend has of you Ñ that you will trust her 
for the truth, and so presume she knows what she says, and so view her telling as giving 
you a distinctive reason for belief Ñ is the general expectation that one has, as a speaker, 
in telling someone something.  
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Then with respect to your getting to know that your friend is innocent, what 
makes this possible is your being justified in suspending any belief in your friendÕs guilt 
as a result of rationally deliberating whether your friend is guilty. Friendship figures in 
this explanation Ñ it is the demands of friendship that prompt your deliberation Ñ but it 
does not figure essentially insofar as what makes the justified suspension of belief 
possible are general facts about the agency we enjoy in thinking. Maybe the most that 
could be said is this: friendship is practically necessary because while critical reflection 
on the question of your friendÕs guilt is open to any audience, it is only because of 
friendship that you are willing to push your deliberation to the point of being justified in 
giving your friend the benefit of the doubt. Equally, it is only because of friendship that 
your friend can expect this of you. For this reason, your friend seeks you out, her friend, 
because there is no point in telling another that she is innocent if they could not get 
themselves into a position where they could learn from her that this is so because what 
your friend wants, crucially, is for someone else to know of her innocence.
19
 
 
 
Audi, R. (1997). ÒThe Place of Testimony in the Fabric of Knowledge and JustificationÓ, 
American Philosophical Quarterly, 34(4): 405-422. 
Baker, J. (1987). ÒTrust and RationalityÓ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 68: 1-13. 
                                                
19
 Thanks to Sandy Goldberg, Arnon Keren, Matt Soteriou, Bob Stern and audiences at Universities of 
Frankfurt, Haifa, London and at the 2017 Summer School in Social Epistemology. 
27 
Brown, J. (2008). ÒSubject-Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical 
ReasoningÓ, Nos 42(2): 167-189. 
DeRose, K. (1992). ÒContextualism and Knowledge AttributionsÓ, Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 52(4): 913-929. 
Fantl, J., & McGrath, M. (2009). Knowledge in an Uncertain World. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press). 
Faulkner, P. (2007). ÒOn Telling and TrustingÓ, Mind 116(464): 875-902. 
ÑÑÑ. 2011. Knowledge on Trust. (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Fricker, M. (2012). ÒGroup Testimony? The Making of a Collective Good InformantÓ, 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84(2): 249-276. 
Goldberg, S. (2017). ÒAgainst Epistemic Partiality in Friendship: Value Reflecting 
ReasonsÓ, unpublished paper. 
Hawley, K. (2014). ÒPartiality and Prejudice in TrustingÓ, Synthese 191: 2029-45. 
Hieronymi, P. (2008). ÒThe Reasons of TrustÓ, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 
86(2): 213-236. 
Hinchman, E. (2005). ÒTelling as Inviting to TrustÓ, Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 70(3): 562-587. 
ÑÑÑ. (2014). ÒAssurance and WarrantÓ, PhilosophersÕ Imprint, 14: 1-58. 
28 
Holton, R. (1994). ÒDeciding to Trust, Coming to Believe,Ó Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy, 72(1): 63-76. 
Ichikama, J. J., & Steup, M. (2014). ÒThe Analysis of KnowledgeÓ, in E. N. Zalta (Ed.), 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition). 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/knowledge-analysis/>. 
Kawall, J. (2013), ÒFriendship and Epistemic NormsÓ, Philosophical Studies, 165: 349-
70. 
Keller, S. (2004). ÒFriendship and BeliefÓ, Philosophical Papers, 33(3): 329-51. 
Kelly, T. (2008). ÒDisagreement, Dogmatism and Belief PolarizationÓ, The Journal of 
Philosophy, 105(10): 611-633. 
Keren, A. (2007). ÒEpistemic Authority, Testimony and the Transmission of 
KnowledgeÓ, Episteme, 4(3): 368-381. 
Lewis, D. (1996). ÒElusive KnowledgeÓ, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74: 549-
567. 
Marušić, B. (2015). Evidence and Agency: Norms of Belief for Promising and Resolving. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Moran, R. (2005). ÒGetting Told and Being BelievedÓ, PhilosophersÕ Imprint, 5(5): 1-29. 
Pace, M. (2011). ÒThe Epistemic Value of Moral Considerations: Justification, Moral 
Encorachment, and JamesÕ ÔWill to BelieveÕÓ, Nos, 45: 239-268. 
Ross, A. (1986). ÒWhy Do We Believe What We Are Told?", Ratio 28(1): 69-88. 
29 
Soteriou, M. (2013). The Mind's Construction: The Ontology of Mind and Mental Action. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Stanley, J. (2004). Knowledge and Practical Interests. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press). 
Strawson, P.F. (2008). ÒFreedom and ResentmentÓ, in Strawson (Ed.), Freedom and 
Resentment and Other Essays, (London: Routledge), 1-28. 
Stroud, S. (2006). ÒEpistemic Partiality in FriendshipÓ, Ethics, 116: 498-524. 
Velleman, D. (1996). ÒThe Possibility of Practical ReasonÓ, Ethics, 106(4): 694-726. 
Vendler, Z. (1979). ÒTelling the FactsÓ, in French (Ed.), Contemporary Perspectives in 
the Philosophy of Language, MidWest Studies in Philosophy, (1979): 220-232.  
 
